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__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: Increased stake of boards in the leadership of the hospitals makes them play a 
significant  role in the financial health of their institutions. Understanding of the correct 
approach to successfully fulfill this purpose is critical for preparing their organizations for 
positioning  adequately  in  the  health  care  market.  Governmental  agencies  and  public 
companies, including insurers, will be interested in the extent to which hospital boards have 
adopted the provisions of accounting reform laws like those introduced by the Sarbanes-
Oxley  Act.  It  will  remain  for  the  boards  to  balance  their  oversight  role  for  financial 
performance with the pressures of financial accountability. 
Keywords: Hospital and health system boards, governance, performance, marginal profit. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
The  fiduciary  responsibilities  of  boards  of  trustees  are  better  understood  than  other  tasks,  but 
questions still exist regarding the role played by boards in fulfilling specific aspects of these duties. 
The  way  boards  are  interpreting  their  role  in  financial  oversight  and  the  way  they  use  financial 
information to make decisions that impact the hospital financial performance are less explored in the 
scientific  literature.  The  goal  of  this  investigation  was  to  identify  whether  boards  of  trustees  that 
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proactively adopt theoretical and normative guidelines for the financial oversight process are more 
likely to achieve better financial performance for their hospitals. 
An effective hospital board been shown to be related to high hospital financial performance [1]. The 
board of trustees has six core financial responsibilities: (1) to specify financial objectives, (2) to review 
and align the management financial plan with stated objectives, (3) to enhance creditworthiness, (4) to 
ensure capital is effectively allocated, (5) to monitor financial performance, and (6) to verify financial 
statements [2]. In a survey of nonfederal community hospitals both Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
and trustees indicated that financial aspects of organizational performance received the most attention 
during board meetings [3]. Financial performance was the criteria most commonly used to evaluate 
hospitals and CEOs of hospitals [4,5]. The specific aim of this investigation was to further explore the 
type of information hospital boards used for financial decision-making and the extent to which the 
interpretation of financial data related to hospital financial performance. The results will help define 
activities that boards need to adopt in order to establish the financial oversight necessary to improve 
financial  performance.  Such  conclusions  could  be  used  by  the  boards  of  trustees  for  review  and 
implementation as they adopt principles of evidence-based decision making. 
One of the three pillars of hospital governance is ‘overseeing the operations of the organization and 
the  board’  [1,3,5,6].  The  infrastructure  that  boards  need  to  perform  effective  financial  oversight 
includes  appropriate  committees  and  access  to  expeditiously  reviewed  information  [7].  Relevant 
information  tools  available  to  enable  fast  decision  making  are  the  ‘score-card’  [8]  and  the  
‘dashboard’  [9].  The  CEOs  recommend  indicators  for  inclusion  on  these  instruments  which  then 
underwent periodic review at the discretion of the board of trustees. The ‘balanced scorecard’ concept 
includes  four key dimensions  of performance:  organizational,  executive, quality and financial  [8]. 
Each dimension has its own strategy. Some financial indicators that can be found on a scorecard are 
cash flow, efficiency, charity care, debt structure, or return on investment. A sound financial strategic 
plan  should  also  be  concerned  with  aspects  of  profitability,  liquidity,  creditworthiness,  capital 
structure,  and  asset  activity  [8].  The  financial  ‘dashboard’  includes  specific  market  conditions 
(operating margin, personnel expense, and supply expense) and benchmarks relevant to them [8]. It is 
recommended that these indicators be reviewed monthly with a predetermined plan in place to take 
appropriate action in the event of negative variances [9]. One study found that ‘dashboards’ included 
comparisons with other hospitals, but they were used mostly for information purposes rather than for 
performance management [10]. 
Part of board’s responsibility to assure financial health of the hospital and health care system is to 
establish strong processes of operational planning and budgeting, and of monitoring and reporting the 
progress [11]. Boards should be able to understand the main variances in financial performance and 
identify correction mechanisms for the management. The metrics for financial evaluation should be 
compared with national benchmarks. In this sense, governance effectiveness depends on the financial 
literacy  of  the  board,  as  well  as  the  participation  of  board  members  in  continuing  education  [7]. 
Hospital boards typically have a diverse number of members, many of whom are not financial experts. 
Hence a board relies on its finance committee to monitor financial performance, oversee budgeting and 
capital  expenditures,  and  endowment  performance.  It  is  recommended  that  some  members  of  the 
finance committee have a business background (retired accountants, treasurers, etc.) and that trustees 
be assigned specific tasks for effective governance [12]. A finance committee should ideally perform Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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several tasks with a certain consistency. Each year members of the committee need to develop a work 
plan to establish financial objectives. Members must also review financial planning, capital projects 
and  financial  conditions,  including  creditworthiness.  In  addition,  the  finance  committee  has  the 
responsibility to evaluate management activity for financial success. The finance committee needs to 
determine, at least biannually, if the financial plan is aligned with the strategic plan, and quarterly 
evaluate operational budgets and review quantitative financial metrics (indicators and standards) [13]. 
As  an  increased  amount  of  information  becomes  available  to  the  hospital  boards,  healthcare 
organizations  are  also  forced  towards  greater  transparency  [14].  Boards  should  publish  financial 
reports for their stakeholders every trimester and send internal financial reports every month [15]. 
Most of the governance studies evaluated the board dynamics and decision making in terms of 
member selection and interaction. Previous research concerned with hospital financial performance in 
high performing hospitals looked at the structure of the board and the level of engagement among 
board  members,  and  emphasized  the  relationship  between  the  board  and  the  hospital  leadership  
team [5]. Empirical investigations have found partial correlation between financial performance and 
board effectiveness [1] or between governance configuration and hospital performance [2]. While an 
association was found between high financial performance and board dynamics, it was not clear how 
one influenced the other [5]. Thus far the relationship between board activities and functions and 
hospital financial performance has been explored to a lesser extent. The present study investigated 
whether  boards  used  the  theoretical  and  practical  guidelines  described  above  for  their  financial 
oversight process and how this process was correlated to the hospital financial performance. 
1.1. Study Design 
In  a  governance  survey  conducted  in  2005  more  than  75%  of  hospitals  reported  having  a 
finance/budget committee [3]. The report further showed that financial performance was the criteria 
most often utilized to evaluate hospital performance. Hospitals routinely reviewed financial statements 
and budget  performance. Among the hospitals  that  used benchmarks in their evaluation, financial 
performance  had  first  priority.  These  hospitals  did  not  routinely  share  their  benchmarks  with  the 
community,  or with  the managed  care organizations.  Although financial/business  acumen was  the 
second  skill  set  sought  when  hiring  new  board  members,  their  knowledge  about  insurance  and 
managed care were viewed as less important. The present study explored the association between 
specific structural and functional characteristics of the boards and their financial oversight. Activities 
relevant to this role depicted from the 2005 survey were examined in relationship to hospital financial 
performance. 
1.2. Key Measures 
Data about the financial performance of the hospitals included in the study was extracted from 
2003-2005  American  Hospital  Association  annual  survey.  The  measures  of  hospital  financial 
performance  used  in  previous  studies  in  relation  to  governance  were  cash  flow  and  operating  
margin  [1].  The  Solucient  100  Top  Hospitals
®  National  Benchmarks  for  Success  study  annually 
examines changing performance levels in U.S.  hospitals and objectively identifies 100 benchmark 
hospitals based on overall performance. Financial measures employed by Solucient to produce these Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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rankings  included  expense  per  adjusted  discharge,  operating  profit  margin,  cash  to  total  debt  and 
tangible  assets  [16].  The  financial  indicator  selected  for  this  study  was  the  total  marginal  profit 
(operating profit margin) to mirror the profitability of the hospital [17]. The operating profit margin 
was calculated as a proportion of the difference between total annual revenue and total expenses from 
the total revenue. This approach was used because the indicator was not affected by institutional size 
and was also employed by the rating agencies. A summary measure was created to reflect the financial 
performance of the respective hospitals as an indicator of their overall financial health. This measure 
was obtained by averaging the operating profit margin over the three year period of the evaluation. 
Selected domains of the 2005 Governance survey considered indicative of board infrastructure and 
its financial oversight processes represented the main groups of independent variables. The structural 
elements  and  functional  characteristics  of the board constituted  its  infrastructure.  The information 
relevant for board structure included in the study were the selection criteria for new board members, 
the board size, the number and type of committees the boards were instituting in their hospitals, the 
compensation  mechanisms  available  for  board  members,  and  the  presence  of  the  Chief  Financial 
Officer (CFO) as a member of the board. The frequency of annual meetings boards were engaged, the 
tenure board members were serving in their capacities, the length of terms they were serving on the 
board, and the use of financial criteria for performance evaluation of the CEO served as measures of 
board characteristics. The indicators for board financial oversight responsibility were based on whether 
they used benchmarks to evaluate hospital financial performance, the extent to which they shared these 
benchmarks and with whom, the actual review of financial performance, and the analysis of financial 
information on a routine basis. A comprehensive presentation of the content of this survey along with 
the descriptive results of the responses to its questions can be found elsewhere [3]. Dummy variables 
were constructed for each response to the questions included in this study. 
1.3. Data Analyses 
Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed to identify how the participating hospitals board’s 
financial oversight, board structure and board characteristics were associated with hospital financial 
performance.  Specifically,  paired  t-tests  were  employed  in  contingency  analyses  to  estimate  the 
association between these dimensions of board infrastructure and dynamics to their hospital financial 
outcomes. In addition, the extent to which financial performance was influenced by the board activities 
and infrastructure was explored with multiple linear regression. The purpose was to test if there was a 
concordance between the dynamics of financial decision-making processes employed by the boards 
and  hospital  financial  outcomes.  Three  regression  models  were  developed  to  test  the  association 
between financial performance and each main group of board traits: structure, characteristics, and 
processes.  Significant  associations  between  board  responses  and  financial  outcomes  found  in  the 
separate regression models were included into a final linear regression to identify the most significant 
factors in board infrastructure and dynamics correlated with hospital financial performance. While in 
the  contingency  analyses  financial  performance  was  represented  by  total  hospital  profit,  in  the 
regression analyses the outcome of interest was operating profit margin calculated as a proportion from 
the total revenue. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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2. Results and Discussion 
It is generally recommended that board members should hold non-tenured positions on the hospital 
board, and that the number of terms they serve should be limited. Almost 24 percent of board directors 
and 19 percent of the other board members of the hospitals that participated in the survey did not have 
limits in the tenure for their appointments on the hospital board. While having no limits in length of 
term among board directors did not appear to influence the marginal profit of the hospital, this was 
higher at the hospitals where the rest of board members had a limit in the terms they served on the 
board. Having limitless numbers of terms as board directors or board members was not associated with 
the  way  hospitals  perform  financially  (Table  1).  The  financial  performance  was  expressed  as  the 
average hospital profit accumulated by the hospitals that participated in the survey over a period of 
three years including the year of the study. 
 
Table 1. The Board Infrastructure and Total Margin of Profit. 
Dimension   Yes  No  P 
  N  Profit Margin
*  N  Profit Margin
*  value 
No Limit Term Length           
 Officers  372  9.9  1,207  9.7  0.82 
 Board members  299  8.6  1,280  10.1  0.03 
No Limit number of Terms 
 Officers  878  9.8  701  9.8  0.91 
 Other board members  700  9.7  879  9.9  0.76 
Compensation for board members 
 Set Annual Fee  38  10.6  1,409  9.6  0.56 
 Per Meeting Fee  142  11.1  1,333  9.5  0.11 
 Reimbursement for Travel  344  9.7  1,119  9.6  0.85 
 Conference Reimbursements  1,180  9.7  313  9.9  0.74 
Standing committees 
 Audit Committee  782  8.7  642  10.8  0.0006 
 Finance/budget Committee  1,098  9.1  367  11.6  0.0003 
 Governance Committee  509  8.9  903  10.3  0.03 
 
CFO member  357  8.9  1,070  10.1  0.08 
Nomination criteria 
 Financial acumen  799  9.4  780  10.2  0.13 
 Insurance knowledge  42  10.1  1,537  9.8  0.86 
 Managed care knowledge  22  9.2  1,557  9.8  0.81 
* This represents the mean value of the total margin of profit. 
 
A  viewpoint  frequently  approached  in  the  debate  about  board  effectiveness  is  whether  board 
members should be compensated for their work as trustee. Boards used incentives such as participation 
fees  or  travel  reimbursement  to  encourage  regular  meeting  attendance  as  well  as  participation  in 
continuing education. In this study, although compensating board members for their service did not Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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have a significant impact on performance, hospital profit was higher when board members had an 
annual fee set for their work, or when trustees received a fee for participating in each meeting. 
The extent to which boards operated standing committees varied largely between the hospitals. 
Generally, there were more audit and budget or finance committees, and less governance entities. In 
spite  of  this  distribution,  the  profit  was  larger  at  hospitals  that  did  not  have  such  committees. 
Furthermore, having the CFO serving officially on the hospital board did not contribute to a higher 
financial performance. 
Another aspect of good governance discussed in expert forums was the selection criteria used when 
appointing new board members. Greater importance was given to diversity of board composition and 
increased expertise in hospital business mostly in the domains of finance and quality of care. Placing 
heavy  emphasis  on  financial  knowledge  as  nomination  criteria  for  new  board  members  was  not 
associated  with  higher  financial  performance,  but  this  lack  of  association  was  not  significant. 
However, having such a competence is important as hospital boards routinely used benchmarks or 
standards  to  evaluate  hospital  financial  performance.  Making  use  of  benchmarks  was  reflected  in 
generally higher hospital profit for all the financial indicators employed in the assessment (Table 2). In 
this sense, regular review of hospital market share made by the board was significantly associated with 
increased financial profit. 
Table 2. The Total Margin of Profit and Board Financial Activities among Non-Profit Hospitals. 
Dimension   Yes  No  P 
  N  Profit 
Margin
* 
N  Profit 
Margin
* 
value 
Financial performance used in CEO evaluation  1,335  9.9  95  10.1  0.85 
Use benchmarks  978  10  534  9.2  0.18 
 Market share  674  10.5  905  9.3  0.04 
 Financial performance  1,051  9.9  528  9.6  0.64 
Sharing benchmarks 
 with Board  1,116  10  463  9.3  0.26 
 with Management  1,105  10  474  9.4  0.30 
 with staff  997  10.1  582  9.4  0.27 
 with community  317  9.1  1,262  10  0.20 
Information reviewed routinely 
 Budget performance  1,503  9.7  76  12  0.07 
 Capital planning  1,426  9.80  153  9.82  0.98 
 Financial statements  1,504  9.6  75  13.3  0.006 
 Operating statistics  1,491  9.7  88  11.2  0.24 
* This represents the mean value of the total margin of profit. 
 
Hospital boards, to large extent, used financial information routinely to evaluate the organizational 
performance. They also used financial benchmarks to compare their performance with other hospitals, 
and  even  shared  these  indicators  internally  and  with  the  community.  A  very  large  proportion  of 
hospital boards informed their executive bodies and the hospital staff about the level of achievement in 
financial  and  other  organizational  indicators.  Sharing  benchmarks  within  an  organization  was 
associated with higher total profit, although the accomplishment did not reach statistical significance. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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The proportion of hospitals that did not inform the communities they served about the overall hospital 
performance  was  almost  four  times  larger  than  the  hospitals  that  did.  In  contrast,  their  financial 
performance  was  slightly  higher  than  the  hospitals  who  shared  their  benchmarks  with  their 
communities. This situation might be found particularly among the for-profit hospitals. 
Although the majority of hospitals made a routine review of financial information, this was not 
associated with higher financial performance. Boards that regularly assessed budget performance and 
financial statements had significantly lower hospital profits. Remarkably, a small number of hospitals 
that did not review budget performance and financial statements routinely, had higher total profits. 
However, this finding may very well be due to chance. 
We  tested  the  boards’  role  in  higher  hospital  financial  performance  with  a  linear  regression 
controlling for the non-profit status of the hospital, and the hospital size measured in terms of number 
of beds.  Given that the frequency  of board meetings was  another factor taken into account when 
measuring board effectiveness, our predictor variable for higher performance was the number of times 
the board met during one financial year. Boards that met less than six times a year had higher marginal 
profit on average over three years than hospitals whose boards met more than 12 times every year. 
Meeting between 7-12 times was associated with lower financial performance than having six or less 
meetings, but still significantly higher than the hospitals whose boards met more than once per month 
(Table 3). 
Table 3. – Board Role in Hospital Financial Performance. 
Variable  Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept  14.57  2.15 
Less than 6 meetings a year   2.55*  1.08 
Between7-12 meetings   1.39*  0.69 
Number of Board Positions  - 0.021  0.06 
Officers have no limit of term length   2.13*  0.96 
Members have no limit of term length   - 3.52**  1.06 
Audit  - 1.52*  0.65 
Market Share   1.71*  0.75 
Financial Performance   0.02  0.81 
Community-At-Large  - 1.47*  0.78 
Capital Planning   3.46**  1.27 
Financial Statements   - 6.01**  2.24 
Non-profit status   - 3.96***  0.74 
Number of beds staffed   0.002  0.001 
*<.05 **<.001 ***<.0001 
 
Although marginal profit was not related to the size of the boards, financial performance was higher 
at the hospitals where board officers had no limit for their terms of appointment. In contrast, having no 
term  length  for appointing the  remainder of  the  board members was  significantly  associated with 
negative financial outcomes. The effect was significantly higher when the board used market share as 
an  indicator.  Greater  profit  was  associated  with  routinely  revisiting  capital  planning.  It  was  quite Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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surprising to find that having an audit committee and systematically verifying the financial statements 
were correlated with low financial performance. Significantly lower marginal profit was found among 
non-profit hospitals in contrast with for profits and public hospitals. Similar results were found among 
the hospitals that shared the performance indicators with their community at large. 
There was an overall positive association between higher financial performance and hospital board 
structure and activity. The number of meetings boards had annually, the tenure of trustee officers on 
their  boards,  and  use  of  financial  indicators  by  boards  as  part  of  their  financial  oversight  was 
associated with higher marginal profit over a three year period. It would seem that holding a board 
meeting almost every month or more often was not a good method to increase financial outcomes. A 
potential explanation for this finding may be that having meetings spaced out allowed for more time to 
prepare well-informed reports, which included relevant financial indicators. Board members had more 
time to get the information in advance and prepare for the meetings accordingly. 
The finding that officers’ tenure on the board had a positive impact on financial performance might 
mean that these positions were not occupied by members of the management team (e.g. CFO) who 
usually did not stay in those positions for any length of time. It was also important to find that financial 
performance  was  much  lower  when  boards  did  not  change  their  regular  membership  over  time. 
Trustees of these boards may have served in their capacities over the entire three year observation 
period  of the study  and this  arrangement  did  not  help  the financial situation of the hospital.  The 
difference between board directors and board members might  have been  due to  a  more proactive 
attitude of the former towards hospital performance.  Board directors or board chairs usually have 
vested interests in the condition of the hospitals and health care systems they serve.  This finding 
suggested greater involvement of board chairs in hospital overall health in contrast to the other board 
members. 
Another  significant  element  was  the  finding  that  assessing  the  hospital  performance  based  on 
specific benchmarks, like market share, led to increased profits. The hospitals whose boards were 
systematically  concerned  with  capital  planning  also  had  higher  marginal  profits.  Giving  higher 
consideration  to  market  share  and  capital  planning  indicated  that  these  institutions  were  more 
aggressive  in  their  business  operations.  Using  generic  measures  of  assessment  (e.g.  financial 
performance) did not influence the marginal profit. This finding might be due to the vagueness of the 
measure. 
Hospitals that were less willing to share their organizational benchmarks with the communities they 
served performed poorly financially. This appeared to be a characteristic of non-profit hospitals that 
generally had lower marginal profits than their counterparts. This finding might favor the view that 
for-profit hospitals were more likely to share their performance information with the communities for 
higher market penetration [18]. 
It  was  surprising  to  note  that  hospitals  whose  boards  had  an  audit  committee  and  those  who 
routinely  reviewed  financial  statements  did  not  show  increased  financial  performance.  An  audit 
committee focuses on compliance issues, hiring and meeting with the outside auditor, and addressing 
any financial reporting irregularities. Lack of evidence of higher financial success might be associated 
with having inadequate audit committees, or low financial literacy among the board members. The 
latter explanation may be supported by the other finding that financial acumen in nominating new 
board members was associated with low hospital profit. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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In  2002  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  (SOX)  was  promulgated  as  a  law  to  regulate  accounting  
reform [19]. SOX was designed to make organizations more accountable to their exposure to financial 
risks in relation to their transactions. The most relevant domains for hospital financial health included 
in SOX were the audit committee and its control over the audit company, the issuance of financial 
statements and the mechanisms for their internal control, and the ethics code for management and 
executive compensation [20]. One of the specific provisions of SOX directed the creation of a separate 
audit committee which was mandated to have at least one expert in accounting [21]. 
The  SOX  Act  triggered  a  chain  of  financial  initiatives  designed  for  the  non  profit  sector  [2]. 
Although not-for-profit organizations were not required by law to adopt the SOX prerogatives, it was 
expected that hospitals and healthcare systems would embrace financial accountability and reporting 
requirements of the act [2]. However, a survey developed by Clark Consulting showed that very few 
boards considered implementation of SOX [22,23]. 
The audit committee has to fulfill certain standards to comply with SOX. This entity centralizes the 
audit function which creates  greater accountability for boards.  An audit firm is hired by an audit 
committee and it should report directly to the audit committee. Members of the committee should all 
be part of the board of directors, and the overlap of members in the audit, financial and investment 
committees should be reduced to minimum. Respecting these standards assure that boards have access 
to  findings,  and  allows them to  focus  on  their oversight  responsibilities,  holding the management 
accountable for the results at the same time. 
One  of  the  requirements  of  SOX  is  for  boards  to  have  at  least  one  financial  expert  in  the 
composition of the audit committee. Such representation is required so as to provide greater credibility 
due  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  auditing  process.  This  improvement  in  understanding  of  the 
auditing  process  is  expected  to  increase  boards’  accountability.  Financial  statements  have  to  be 
certified  by  the  CEO  and  the  CFO  and  then  included  in  the  annual  audit  report.  These  financial 
statements report the financial condition of the company, state whether the CEO and CFO established 
internal controls, describes deficiencies in internal controls, and delineates the corrective actions to be 
taken  to  address  potential  problems.  As  one  of  the  most  important  sections  of  SOX,  issuance  of 
financial  statements  should  follow  certain  guidelines  in  terms  of  the  time  they  are  released,  their 
content, and their dissemination. Ideally the financial statements should be reported quarterly. Such a 
timeframe represents a good guarantee for the creditworthiness of the institution and also has the 
potential to assist the hospital to make a better budget planning. However, it is important that financial 
statements are supported by proof of internal control mechanisms in relation to financial reporting. 
3. Conclusions 
One limitation of the study was the potential issue of reverse causality (i.e. the governance variables 
may themselves be affected by the hospital performance). Hospitals in better financial shape may 
require only few meetings per year, and better financial performance may enable a hospital to acquire 
greater market share. Similarly, the reviews of financial performance (i.e. use of financial statements) 
might be the result of poor hospital financial status (as reflected by the negative relationship found in 
the regression analysis). This issue was a concern because the governance survey was from 2005 and 
the financial performance data was covering the 2003-2005 period. Consequently, the findings may be 
able to determine an association between such variables rather than identify a causal relationship. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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In summary, boards should meet less frequently and allow enough time between their meetings to 
accumulate critical indicators of performance for review. Highest preference should be given to have a 
meeting every other month. The findings of this study reinforced the idea that board membership 
should  be  non-tenured,  and  that  board  positions  should  have  a  limited  number  of  terms  for  each 
member. A greater turnover of board members (as opposed to life-terms) would create an increased 
sense of responsibility towards the community. This could also lead to higher accountability among 
the boards, and implicitly, the hospitals. It was not clear if compensating trustees for their service on 
the board helped to achieve better financial performance, although in a very small number of situations 
there  was  an  association  with  higher  hospital  profit.  Board  compensation  might  be  a  function  of 
hospitals with higher profit, which allows them the financial flexibility to reimburse their trustees. 
Continuing to evaluate hospital performance by using well defined financial indicators (like market 
share) and defining normative targets (e.g. capital planning) will facilitate the achievement of positive 
results. Multiple financial benchmarks and their comparisons with nationwide corresponding data may 
yield even more improvement for the financial health of the hospitals. 
Positive associations between board infrastructure and dynamics with higher financial performance 
found in this study appeared to support the theoretical view of corporate type of boards
 [17] that place 
emphasis on fewer, more effective meetings, greater interest in market share, and expansion through 
large investment in capital planning. Based on the same theory of board typology, elements associated 
with lower financial performance seemed to favor the philanthropic type of boards [18] with members 
elected  for  indefinite  (lifetime)  terms  which  may  have  made  them  less  motivated  to  be  actively 
involved in hospital performance. The control mechanisms used by these types of boards are less 
intensive, as they are not looking routinely into their financial statements. In addition, these boards 
might not have had the right structure for the audit committees in terms of appropriately qualified 
personnel with adequate financial knowledge. 
Issuance of the SOX was meant to refocus the concern of the board onto the overall performance of 
the  organization  itself.  The  board  needs  to  initiate  organizational  performance  assessment,  and  to 
envision  avenues  for  improvement  in  the  domains  of  capital  and  financial  performance,  revenue 
position,  cost  position,  market  strength  and  CEO  performance  evaluation.  The  question  remains 
whether making boards more accountable for financial transactions in relation to financial risks will 
leave them less occupied with financial oversight. There is a perception that pressures from SOX may 
push  boards  towards  getting  involved  in  details  related  to  the  financial  transactions  for  risk 
management  topics  rather  than  analyzing  financial  metrics  and  fulfilling  their  oversight  role. 
Consequently, this situation may create a disproportion in the role played by the boards on financial 
performance,  shifting  them  more towards financial management rather than financial oversight. A 
specific aspect for future research would be to inquire whether hospital boards of trustees have adopted 
directives of SOX and the extent to which this adoption interferes with their financial oversight role. 
Overall, more detailed insight is necessary into the process of financial oversight preformed by 
boards of trustees to identify the type of information they have available and the way boards use the 
information to make decisions that impact the financial performance of the hospitals they lead. Other 
financial measures that can be considered for future investigations are the total expense per adjusted 
discharge [15], the ratio of uncompensated care to total expense, and a composite score consisting of 
total margin, operating margin, expenses per adjusted discharges and total assets. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6                   
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Governmental agencies and public companies (including insurance providers) will be interested in 
the extent to  which hospital  boards have adopted the provisions  of the SOX and the relationship 
between adoption and their overall performance [19]. It is believed that hospitals and health systems 
will strengthen their governance by voluntary adopting SOX provisions regarding financial reporting 
[20]. Under the current pressure for better performance and accountability hospitals are facing, it is 
assumed that their boards could not afford to ignore adoption of these directives [15]. As one recent 
document underscored, adoption of SOX may be soon seen as a standard for hospital governance 
effectiveness [15]. Based upon the conclusions of this study, future Governance surveys should be 
designed to explore the impact of SOX on hospitals and healthcare systems performance. In addition, 
relevance of governance to medical outcomes, safety, access to care, community standing and overall 
costs of care should be examined as well. 
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